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Abstract 
We study the frequency of restatements by foreign firms listed on the U.S. exchanges. We find 
that the restatement rate by U.S. listed foreign firms is significantly lower than that of comparable 
U.S. firms and the difference depends on the home country characteristics of the foreign firm. 
Foreign firms from countries with a weak rule of law are less likely to restate than firms from 
strong rule of law countries are, despite companies from the weaker rule of law countries having 
higher levels of earnings management. After controlling for the materiality of the restatement, 
firms from weak rule of law countries are more likely to opt for less visible restatement disclosure 
methods. We interpret these findings as home country enforcement affecting firms’ likelihood of 
reporting existing accounting irregularities. This suggests that for U.S. listed foreign firms, less 
frequent restatements can be a signal of opportunistic reporting rather than high quality earnings. 
Keywords: Accounting restatements, earninings management, home country enforcement 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
We examine the reporting of accounting restatements by foreign firms listed in the United 
States. Accounting rules in the U.S. require firms to issue a restatement correcting prior errors, 
upon discovery, in  a timely manner  (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 154). The 
mandatory reporting requirement implies that, in principle, lower earnings quality should increase 
the  likelihood  of  an  accounting  restatement.  Consequently,  a  number  of  studies  consider 
restatements to be a signal of poor earnings quality (e.g., Plumlee and Yohn 2010; Ecker et al. 
2011). 
While a restatement implies less reliable financial reporting quality, it also means that the 
firm detected and disclosed the error. The process leading to reporting a restatement involves two 
steps (Dyck et al. 2010). First, managers commit an unintentional error or deliberate manipulation 
that  results  in  misstated  accounting  numbers.  Second,  the  firm  detects  and  reports  the 
misstatement (Keune and Johnstone 2012). The second step, requiring detection and self reporting 
of the misstatement, depends on the firm’s and auditors’ ability and willingness to comply with 
the mandated rule (Heitzman et al. 2010). Therefore, observing a restatement is a joint outcome of 
1)  committing  an  accounting  error  and  2)  correcting  and  reporting  the  prior  misstatement. 
Therefore, a high rate of restatements  can signify both weakness in accounting quality but also 
the ability to subsequently detect and report the error. 
A number of prior studies focus on the first step and show how incentives to engage in 
earnings  management  are  associated  with  more  frequent  restatements  (e.g.,  Richardson  et  al. 
2002; Doyle. et al. 2007a; Efendi et al. 2007). The higher frequency of restatements in the late 
1990s has been used to motivate regulatory action to improve accounting quality (GAO 2002; 
Coates 2007). In this paper, we also explicitly consider the second step, which implies that a 
higher frequency of restatements also suggests compliance with reporting requirements and the 2 
 
ability of internal controls and auditors to detect and disclose mistakes. We examine whether 
foreign  firms  differ  from  U.S.  firms  in  their  tendency  to  detect  and  disclose  errors  and 
irregularities in their financial statements, conditional on having low earnings quality. Drawing on 
prior literature, we examine if country factors are an important determinant of a firm’s reporting 
behavior (Ball et al. 2000) and whether they continue to impact reporting quality even after a firm 
lists in the U.S. 
We  use  the  large  number  of  restatements  in  recent  years,  by  both  U.S.  and  foreign 
registrants, to examine the effect of home country characteristics on the reliability of restatement 
reporting. The self reporting nature of restatements provides a good setting to compare foreign 
firms to U.S. firms and assess how home country characteristics influence the reliability of the 
financial statements of foreign firms listed in the U.S. Furthermore, since foreign firms are subject 
to the disclosure requirements set forth by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), this 
setting allows us to examine the effect of home country characteristic while holding the extent of 
regulation constant (Jenkins 1999; Lang et al. 2006).  
Our  main  prediction  is  that  the  extent  to  which  errors  and  irregularities  in  financial 
statements are reported as a restatement will vary by a firm’s incentives for rule enforcement. 
Following  prior literature, we  argue that  variation in  home country  enforcement  continues  to 
shape the firm’s reporting behavior. Lang et al. (2006) document lower earnings quality in foreign 
listers compared to U.S. firms, which should result in a greater extent of restatements by foreign 
firms listed in the U.S., relative to domestic U.S. firms. However, this assumes that errors are 
detected  and  reported  equally  for  foreign  and  U.S.  firms.  If  foreign  firms  fail  to  report 
misstatements due to a lack of detection or due to opportunistic misreporting, it is possible that 
higher level of earnings management will not necessarily lead to more frequent restatements. 3 
 
Empirically,  we  infer  the  magnitude  of  detection  and  disclosure  by  associating  the 
frequency of restatements with the level of earnings management and the existence of internal 
control weaknesses (ICW). If firms correctly report their accounting irregularities, the frequency 
of restatements will be positively associated with proxies for a firm’s earnings management and 
ICW. In contrast, if potential restatements go undetected or unreported, we expect the relationship 
between restatement frequency and earnings management (or ICW) to weaken. In our empirical 
analyses  we  test  whether  the  association  between  restatement  frequency  and  earnings 
management (ICW) will increase with the home country’s rule of law.  
Our sample comprises 7,890 firm-year observations for U.S. listed foreign firms from 52 
countries between 2000 and 2010. The foreign firms report accounting restatements in 9.94% of 
the firm-years, compared to 15.31% for a matched sample of U.S. domestic firms.
1 We confirm 
the lower rate of restatements among the foreign firms compared to U.S. firms with multivariate 
tests that control for factors that prior papers have found to be associated with restatements. 
Next, we examine whether home country  factors affect the likelihood of restatements.  We 
follow prior studies such as Ball et al. (2000) and Leuz et al. (2003) , which  document cross 
country variation in accounting quality driven by  the strength of the domestic legal institutions. 
Even though stricter disclosure and governance rules in the U.S. provide incentives for companies 
to improve their reporting quality, weak domestic demand for high quality financial reporting can 
limit the availability of resources (e.g., good auditors, independent boards) needed for firms to 
improve on this dimension.  We use a country level  measure of the rule of law  as a summary 
indicator of the extent of compliance with laws and regulations that can  shape a firm’s reporting 
                                                           
1 The restatements we consider are all made to correct misstatements resulting from a failure to comply with the 
standards companies use to report in the U.S. We do not measure violations of local accounting rules since we are 
interested in understanding reporting behavior in the U.S., how it compares with that of similar U.S. firms, and how it 
varies across countries. Hence we use a common basis which is the requirements that are in place for U.S. reporting. 4 
 
behavior by impacting factors such as auditor effort, investor protection, managerial self-dealing, 
etc. We use the rule of law index from the Worldwide Governance Indicators created by the 
World Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2003) and used in La Porta et al. (2006).
2,3 If home country factors 
continue  to  affect  the  occurrence  and/or  reporting  of  accounting  irregularities,  it  will  have  a 
systematic effect on the restatement frequency of U.S. listed foreign firms, despite all these firms 
being held to the same reporting and auditing standards in the U.S. 
We find that the frequency of restatements varies with the home country’s rule of law. Firms 
from weak rule of law countries are less likely to restate, with 7.64% of firm years  restated, 
compared to 14.6 % of firm years for the matched sample of U.S. firms, despite the foreign firms 
having  higher  levels  of  earnings  management  on  average;  this  difference  is  statistically 
significant (p-value <0.001). On the other hand, firms from strong rule of law countries show a 
smaller difference in their restatement frequency compared to matched U.S. firms (11.4% vs. 
15.8% of firm years). The findings hold in multivariate tests after controlling for the difference 
in  the  earnings  properties  of  foreign  firms  that  provide  GAAP  reconciliation  as  opposed  to 
providing a full set of U.S. GAAP accounts.  
The lower rate of restatements for weak rule of law countries, however, can represent an 
absence of accounting irregularities as well as a lack of detection and disclosure. We distinguish 
between two interpretations of restatements – (1) a signal of poor earnings quality and (2) a 
signal of prudent restatement reporting – by associating the frequency of restatements with the 
quality of reported earnings. We find that the association between restatement frequency and 
                                                           
2 Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society as measured in 
the  year  2000. These  include  the  effectiveness  and  predictability  of  the  judicial  system,  the  enforceability  of 
contracts, and perceptions of the incidence of crime in the country (LaPorta et al. 2006). 
3 In additional analysis, we test the sensitivity of our inferences to the rule of law index used in Leuz et al. (2003). In 
addition to the original rule of law measure, the modified rule of law index includes (1) the efficiency and integrity of 
the country’s judicial system and (2) the degree of government corruption. 5 
 
earnings management increases with the home country’s rule of law effectiveness. Firms from 
weak rule of law countries show no evidence of more frequent restatements when the level of 
earnings management is high than when it is low. In contrast, firms from strong rule of law 
countries and the matched U.S. sample show the expected strong positive relationship between 
restatements  and  earnings  management.  We  confirm  these  results  using  internal  control 
weaknesses (instead of earnings management) as a measure of weak accounting quality. Thus, 
the lower frequency of restatements seen in firms from weaker rule of law countries is related to 
lower compliance with restatement reporting rather than higher accounting quality.  
Finally, we examine the disclosure medium that U.S. listed foreign companies use to reveal 
a  restatement.  Following  Myers  et  al.  (2010),  less  visible  disclosure  methods  are  those 
announced in  scheduled financial statements  or in  amended statements  (e.g., 10-K, 20-F,  or 
equivalent), with no prominent notice of the restatement. These are sometimes called ‘stealth 
restatements’ in  the literature. Visible announcement methods  include filing a separate form 
(e.g., 8-K, 6-K, late filing notice) or a press release. We test whether firms from weak rule of law 
countries are more likely to choose opaque disclosure methods after controlling for restatement 
severity. The results show that 73.3% of firms from weak rule of law countries use “stealth” 
disclosure methods, considerably higher than the 48.3% for the matched U.S. firms and the 61.5 
% for firms from strong rule of law countries. The findings hold in multivariate analysis after 
controlling for the magnitude of the restatements and for other firm and country characteristics.  
Our findings suggest that home country factors affect the reporting behavior of foreign firms 
listed  in  the  U.S.,  despite  all  firms  being  subject  to  the  same  U.S.  rules  and  enforcement 
mechanisms.  In  economic  terms,  after  controlling  for  other  determinants  of  restatement 
probability, firms from weak rule of law countries are 1.72 times less likely to restate than are 6 
 
firms from strong rule of law countries. Our analysis highlights the two parts of the restatement 
decision – the first is low earnings quality and the second, the disclosure decision. Since our 
analysis conditions  restatement  reporting  on prior earnings  management  and internal  control 
weaknesses the lower frequency of restatement for firms from weak rule of law countries is 
likely due to a reluctance to admit misstatements, rather than a reflection of a lack of such 
problems. 
Our paper contributes to a few streams of literature. The first  examines the causes and 
consequences of restatements. These studies generally focus on U.S. firms and conclude that 
restatements represent poor earnings quality and that firms suffer capital market consequences as 
a result (Palmrose et al. 2004; Plumlee and Yohn 2010). We highlight the two stages in the 
restatement decision and show that in the absence of overall good governance in some countries, 
restatement reporting can be opportunistic and thus only weakly related to  a firm’s earnings 
quality. 
Our findings have broader implications for understanding reporting quality of foreign firms 
listed in the U.S. The stringent disclosure rules required by U.S. securities laws and the resulting 
transparency are considered important mechanism through which foreign firms bond to the U.S. 
regulatory regime. However, prior studies show that the reporting quality of foreign firms listed 
in the U.S. falls short of that of the U.S. firms (Lang et al. 2006). Natuarally, one can expect 
more errors and irregularities in the financial statement of U.S. listed foreign firms (and therefore 
more frequent restatements). However, we find that foreign firms are less likely to restate. This 
is  because the degree to which firms  reliably  disclose existing accounting irregularities  also 
shows large variation across foreign and U.S. firms. The variation in the reliability of restatement 7 
 
reporting  suggests  that  for  foreign  firms,  less  frequent  restatements  can  be  a  signal  of 
opportunistic reporting rather than high quality earnings. 
Finally, our findings have regulatory implications. The disclosure of accounting problems 
provides a basis for SEC investigations and investor scrutiny (Feroz et al. 1991; Hennes et al. 
2008;  Files  et  al.  2009).  The  SEC  describes  restatements  as  "the  most  visible  indicator  of 
improper accounting — and source of new investigations" (Schroeder 2001). Firms that do not 
restate  errors/irregularities  in  their  financials  lower  the  risk  of  an  SEC  investigation  and 
securities litigation. In the absence of an alternative mechanism that can trigger investigations, 
our results imply that U.S. listed foreign firms are under-scrutinized by U.S. public and private 
enforcement mechanisms.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and empirical tests; section 4 presents our 
results. In section 5, we present additional analyses and conclude in Section 6. 
 
2.  HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
2.1 Home country effect and reporting by foreign firms listed in the U.S. 
Foreign firms listed in the U.S. follow disclosure requirements set forth by the SEC and 
relevant laws such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
Under U.S. securities laws, foreign private issuers listed on a major U.S. stock exchange are 
required to make ongoing filings with the SEC and are subject to SEC oversight and enforcement 
actions.  Prior  research  considers  this  commitment  to  ongoing  disclosure  and  enforcement  of 
securities laws as enabling foreign firms to reap the benefits of listing on the U.S. capital market 
(Karolyi 2006; Reese and Weisbach 2002). As a result, studies find benefits of U.S. listing such 8 
 
as a lower cost of capital (Errunza and Miller 2000), higher firm value (Foerster and Karolyi 
1999), and a better reporting quality relative to non-cross listed firms (Lang et al. 2003). 
In addition to subjecting firms to higher quality reporting standards, U.S. listing can increase 
reporting quality by increasing the monitoring of the auditors involved. Auditors of firms listed in 
the U.S. face higher litigation risk than those in other countries (Choi et al. 2009; La Porta et al. 
2006), and this can lead to greater audit effort. Case law shows that provisions of the Securities 
Acts extend to all auditors of U.S. registrants, even if the auditors are not based in the U.S. 
(Seetharaman et al. 2002). Also, the SEC seeks increasing oversight of the auditors of foreign 
registrants through the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).
4 For example, 
for foreign registrants,  the quality control standards  of PCAOB (SECPS 1000.08) Appendix K 
requires a qualified auditor familiar with SEC rules and regulations (“filing reviewer”) to review 
the sample audit procedure of all non-U.S. auditors. 
Despite such increased monitoring, prior studies find that the quality of disclosure by U.S. 
listed foreign firms is not always on par with that of U.S. firms. Lang et al. (2006) show that 
reported earnings of foreign issuers show more evidence of earnings management than earnings 
of U.S. firms. They also find that accounting quality of cross-listed firms varies systematically by 
home country characteristics such as investor protection and legal enforcement.  While Lang et al. 
results are informative, they caution in their conclusions that the earnings quality metrics used in 
their study have weaknesses. Restatements offer the advantage that they are a clear violation of 
accounting rules and hence a more precise signal of accounting quality (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Foreign  firms  from  weak  investor  protection  countries  are  less  likely  to  voluntarily  report 
                                                           
4 In additional analysis, we use the variation in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)’s ability 
to conduct an investigation into the auditors of the foreign firms listed in the U.S. and show that U.S. enforcement is 
also an important determinant of restatement likelihood. See secion 5.1 for details.  9 
 
incidents  of  internal  control  weaknesses  (Gong  et  al.  2010)  and  are  less  likely  to  provide 
management forecasts (Hope et al. 2011). These findings suggest that U.S. regulation, monitoring 
by the SEC, and the demands of U.S. investors and analysts do not completely harmonize the 
reporting behavior of U.S. listed foreign firms with that of domestic U.S. firms. 
Firms have an incentive to avoid reporting restatements, because the truthful reporting of a 
past misstatement, whether intentional or otherwise, draws attention to the severity of accounting 
mistakes,  undermines  the  credibility  of  internal  controls  and  financial  statements,  and  has 
negative firm-level and managerial consequences (Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Srinivasan, 2005; 
Desai et al. 2006; Collins et al. 2009;DeHaan, Hodge, and Shevlin 2012 ).
5 Foreign firms are 
sensitive to this incentive, as one reason for listing in the U.S. is to be bound to a higher quality 
financial reporting regime (Stulz 1999;Coffee 2002). At the same time, prior studies find that 
foreign cross-listed firms show a greater tendency towards earnings management, which can in 
turn increase the likelihood of restatements ( DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991; Lang et al. 2006) . 
Thus, we first examine whether foreign firms restatement frequency differs from that of U .S. 
firms and whether the difference varies systematically by home country characteristics. 
H1: The probability of restatements by foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. will vary by the 
level of home-country rule of law. 
 
There are several reasons to expect restatement frequency to vary systematically by home 
country characteristics. Restatements often represent extreme examples of poor quality earnings 
(Palmrose et al. 2004; Dechow et al. 2011). Leuz et al. (2003)  document that foreign firms 
exhibit more evidence of earnings management, especially in countries with weak enforcement. 
Also, Lang et al. (2006) find that even after cross-listing, the accounting quality of foreign firms 
                                                           
5 Misstatements can also be detected by the SEC. Cheng et al. (2011) argue that the SEC functions as the “monitors 
of last resort” since management create the financial statements that are reviewed by the auditors before they are filed 
and then reviewed by the SEC. 10 
 
does not measure up to that of U.S. firms. Therefore, if foreign firms listed in the U.S. continue 
to have low quality accounting and more so when firms are from weak rule of law countries, the 
likelihood of restatements for firms from this group of countries will be higher. 
Prior literature on cross-listings suggests that, for U.S. listed foreign firms, the extent of 
bonding to the U.S. regulatory and governance regime differs systematically across countries 
(Frost and Pownall, 1994; Fuerst 1998). This is partly because it is more costly for the SEC to 
pursue enforcement actions and for plaintiffs to sue foreign companies relative to U.S. companies 
(Siegel 2005). There are also differences across countries in the level of domestic supply of expert 
intermediaries like auditors, analysts, lawyers, and institutional investors, as well as the extent of 
domestic enforcement by local capital market regulators. In fact, the cost of enforcement by the 
SEC and private litigation also depends on the availability of a local infrastructure (e.g. lawyers 
and auditors) to support enquiries and action in the home country. 
We use the measure “rule of law” in the home country (La Porta et al. 2006) as a summary 
measure to capture the variation across countries on all of the dimensions discussed above. We 
believe this parsimony is desirable and necessary, as many of the local institutional development 
measures are highly endogenous and develop together. This measure has been widely used in the 
prior literature (e.g., Doidge et al. 2007). We also confirm the robustness of the results with an 
alternate measure of the rule of law index as used in Leuz et al. (2003). 
As  discussed  earlier,  companies  have  an  incentive  to  hide  misstatements,  and  perhaps 
smooth them over time, without reporting a restatement that draws attention to the accounting 
mistakes.  We  identify  whether  firms  report  misstatements  appropriately  by  conditioning  our 
analysis on the existing level of earnings management or internal control (IC) weakness in the 
firm. If firms correctly report their accounting problems, the frequency of restatements will be 11 
 
positively  associated  with  proxies  for  earnings  management  or  IC  weakness.  In  contrast,  if 
restatements are likely to be concealed, we expect to find a less significant relationship between 
restatement frequency and earnings management.  
Prior research suggests that not all material misstatements get reported as restatements even 
in the U.S. context. Libby and Kinney (2000) report experimental evidence that auditors are less 
likely to correct an earnings overstatement if it will result in the company missing the analyst 
consensus forecast. Keune and Johnstone (2012) find that auditors  are more likely to waive 
reporting material misstatements when their reputational and economic stakes in the client are 
lower. They also find that audit committees with lower financial expertise are more likely to 
allow managers to waive material misstatements compared to audit committees with higher level 
of expertise.  
We examine whether the relationship between the level of earnings management and the 
tendency to restate financials varies with the strength of home country rule of law and test the 
following hypothesis.  
H2: The relation between the probability of restatement and earnings management will be 
weaker when the U.S.listed firm is from a country with weak rule of law. 
 
2.2 Restatement disclosure method choices of foreign firms listed in the U.S. 
Prior  studies  show  that,  conditional  on  reporting  a  restatement,  firms  make  disclosure 
choices in the announcement medium and timing to minimize the cost of the restatement (Files et 
al. 2009; Myers et al. 2010). Restatements are generally announced in one of four different ways: 
1) a separate filing (e.g., 8-K or 6-K), 2) a press release, 3) an amended financial statement (e.g., 
10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 20-F/A, or 40-F/A) or non-timely filing (e.g., 10-NTK or equivalent), or 4) a 
scheduled financial statement (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F, or 40-F). The first two types, i.e., separate 
filings  or  press  releases,  are  more  visible  methods  that  clearly  indicate  the  existence  of  the 12 
 
restatement  and  a  timely  disclosure.  The  other  two,  i.e.,  amended  statements  or  regularly 
scheduled  filings  –  sometimes  called  ‘stealth  restatements’  –  provide  information  with  less 
publicity at the time of a regular filing. If home country characteristics affect foreign firms’ 
disclosure methods, then we predict that foreign firms are more likely to disclose restatements 
using a stealth medium, and more so if the firm is from a weak rule of law country. 
In  August  2004,  the  SEC  announced  the  Final  Rule:  Additional  Form  8-K  Disclosure 
Requirements  and  Acceleration  of  Filing  Date  (SEC,  2004),  with  rules  for  disclosing 
restatements. The Final Rule limits the use of “stealth” restatements by requiring firms to file an 
8-K for restatements deemed material. Acito et al. (2009) note that this accounting and auditing 
guidance  does  not  provide  bright  line  rules  for  materiality  assessments,  thus  allowing  for 
judgment in materiality determination. More importantly for this study, the rule does not apply to 
foreign firms filing 20-F or 40-F (SEC, 2004). Foreign firms do not file 8-Ks and instead furnish 
current reports on form 6-K for timely disclosure of a material event (Latham and Watkins, 
2010).
6 This provides foreign firms with more latitude   in  the disclosure method  used  for 
restatements. 
Consistent with the previous hypotheses, w e predict that restatement  disclosure visibility 
will weaken when firms are from a weak rule of law country. 
H3: Firms from weak rule of law countries are more likely to disclose material restatements 
with less visibility than are firms from strong rule of law countries.  
 
 
 
                                                           
6 Unlike filed 8-Ks,  which hold the preparer liable for any  false or  misleading information, 6-Ks are furnished, 
holding the preparer liable only when the preparer is proven to have ‘intentionally’ provided false or misleading 
information. Filed information is subject to the liability provisions of Section 18 of the Exchange Act of 1934 and is 
automatically  incorporated  into  issuers’  registration  statement.  Furnished  information  is  not  subject  to  the  same 
liability section and is not automatically incorporated into the registration statement, unless the issuer specifically 
requests its incorporation. (Morrison and Foerster, LLP – Frequently Asked Questions about Foreign Issuers) 13 
 
3. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1 Sample construction 
Our sample consists of all foreign firms listed on major U.S. exchanges - NYSE, NASDAQ 
and AMEX - from 2000 to 2010. We include both American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and 
foreign firms directly listed on the U.S. exchanges. We exclude OTC traded firms and private 
equity issuers because such firms are not required to register with the SEC under the Securities 
Act of 1933 and therefore do not need to follow U.S. disclosure practices (Doidge 2004).  
We classify firms as foreign if they are headquartered in a foreign country regardless of the 
place of incorporation using the variable LOC from Compustat.
7 We drop firm-years with no 
financial data in Compustat, CRSP, and Worldscope that we need to compute the variables in our 
regression models. These selection criteria provide us  with a sample of 1,364 unique foreign 
firms and 7,890 firm -years. The  restatement sample is obtained from Audit Analytics .  This 
database has been used in prior restatement studies  (e.g., Myers et al. 2010;  Badertscher and 
Burks 2011).  
We partition the foreign firm sample by rule of law in the home country, using the rule of 
law index from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators following La Porta et al. 
(2006).  We classify firms  into strong and weak rule of law country-firms  using  our sample 
country median (=1.64) of the rule of law index. Table 1 presents the distribution of firm-year 
observations and restatements for all countries in the two groups. The table shows that firms 
from weak rule of law countries, on average, restate less than firms from strong rule of law 
                                                           
7 Firms with foreign headquarters that are incorporated in the U.S. frequently represent foreign firms that acquired a 
firm domiciled in the U.S. and did a reverse merger to get listed in the U.S. Since such firms are better characterized 
as non-U.S. firms, we include the reverse-merger firms in our foreign firm sample. 14 
 
countries do. Of the 3,061 firm-years in the weak group, 234 (7.64%) were  restated; of the 4,829 
firm-years in the strong group, 550 (11.39%) were later restated.  
Table 2, Panel A presents the descriptive statistics across our sample firms from strong and 
weak  rule  of  law  countries  and  their  respective  matched  samples  of  U.S.  companies.  All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The matched sample is obtained by performing an exact 
match on year and industry, and a propensity score match based on four firm characteristics – 
size, leverage, ROA, and book-to-market – for each firm year. Compared to firms from countries 
with a strong rule of law, firms from weak rule of law countries are similar in size and leverage, 
have higher profitability (ROA), and fewer growth opportunities (book-to-market ratio). Firms 
from weak rule of law countries are audited by a big five audit firm less frequently (65.9%), 
relative  to  firms  from  strong  rule  of  law  countries  (69.1%)  and  the  U.S.  matched  sample 
(79.4%); they have smaller ownership by U.S. institutions (18.1% vs. 20.1% and 60.7%), less 
analyst coverage (4.03 vs. 6.5 and 9.2), and are less likely to prepare financials using U.S. GAAP 
than by using local GAAP with reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. Also, a smaller portion of firms 
from weak rule of law countries (73.7%) have auditors that allow PCAOB to inspect the firm’s 
audits than the proportion allowed in strong rule of law countries (84.9%). 
3.2 Measures of earnings management  
We use four commonly used measures of earnings management (EM), all estimated at the 
firm-year  level  computed  using  “as  reported”  financials  i.e.,  un-restated  numbers.  The 
underlying  accounting  standards  used  for  the  financials  reported  in  Compustat  vary  by  the 
reporting choice of the foreign firm. Foreign registrants listed in the U.S. are allowed to prepare 
financials using U.S. GAAP, IFRS, or local GAAP with reconciliation to U.S. GAAP.
8 One 
                                                           
8 Company’s accounting standards for foreign registrants are collected from Capital IQ. 15 
 
concern  with  using  financials  prepared  under  different  standards  is  that  the  differences  in 
accounting standards can cause differences in reporting quality (e.g., EM). This can bias our 
inference, particularly if the firm’s reporting choice varies systematically by the firm’s home 
country rule of law. Therefore, in addition to controlling for the accounting standards (Reporting 
choice) in our multivariate analysis, we examine the sensitivity of our findings after dropping 
observations that report using local GAAP with 20-f reconciliation. Untabulated analysis shows 
that our findings remain qualitatively unchanged. 
Our first measure (EM1) is the proportion of small positive income following Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997). For each firm-year, we calculate the percentage of years with small positive 
income using a three-year rolling window, where small positive income is defined as net income 
that falls between 0 and 1% of the firm’s total assets. This measure is used in an international 
setting by Lang et al. (2003) and has been shown to be appropriate when model estimation-based 
earnings management measures are likely to be subject to large measurement error.  
Our second measure of earnings management (EM2) is  the magnitude of total  accruals 
measured as the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value of operating 
cash flows from Leuz et al. (2003). The magnitude of the total accruals is used as a proxy for the 
use of managerial discretion, and scaling by operating cash flows adjusts for the differences in 
firm economics. We use the approach from Dechow et al. (1995) to measure total accruals.  
Our  third  measure  of  earnings  management  (EM3)  is  accruals  quality,  which  captures 
estimation errors in the accounting process by measuring how well accruals map into cash flow 
realizations  following  Dechow  and  Dichev  (2002).  We  operationalize  this  measure  as  the 
standard deviation of the residual from a firm-level regression of prior and future operating cash 
flow. 16 
 
 Finally, we use a smoothing measure to capture the level of management discretion in the 
reported earnings (EM4). The accounting literature has traditionally used a negative correlation 
between changes in accruals and operating cash flows to proxy for management intervention 
over  and  beyond  the  normal  level  of  accrual  accounting  (e.g.,  Francis  et  al.  2005).  We 
operationalize this by calculating the three-year rolling Spearman correlation between changes in 
accruals and changes in operating cash flows.  
We aggregate the four measures into an EM index for each firm-year by first ranking the 
individual measures, an approach similar to that used in Leuz et al. (2003). We use the average 
percentile rank of all four EM proxies. Since firm-level EM measures are expected to have large 
measurement errors (Dechow et al. 2010), we use the quintile ranks of the aggregate EM index in 
our empirical analysis. We sign the measures so that higher values reflect higher EM. 
Table 2 Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of the earnings management measures. 
Consistent with Lang et al. (2006) and Leuz et al. (2003), firms in our sample from weak rule of 
law countries have higher levels of earnings management compared to firms from strong rule of 
law countries, measured using any of the four earnings management measures and the index 
variable, and compared to the U.S. matched sample, on three of the four earnings management 
variables used. It is worth noting that despite having a higher level of earnings management, on 
average, firms from weak rule of law countries show less propensity to restate their earnings. 
With the exception of the % of firm-years with a small positive income measure (5.8% for 
weak rule of law countries and 6.7% for the U.S. matched sample), firms from countries with a 
weak rule of law, on average, have a higher level of earnings management on all the measures 
relative to the matched U.S. firm sample. Consequently, firms from weak rule of law countries 
also have a significantly higher level of earnings management on the overall EM index (p-value 17 
 
< 0.001). On the other hand, the difference in EM index between firms from strong rule of law 
countries and their matched U.S. sample is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.652). 
3.3 Restatement characteristics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics relating to restatement characteristics. Out of the 360 
restatements by foreign firms, 116 are by firms from weak rule of law countries and 244 by firms 
from strong rule of law countries. For our tests of disclosure method choices, we create a second 
matched sample of U.S. firms using only the restatement sample. The matched U.S. restatement 
sample is  selected by propensity score matching on  four  firm  characteristics,  size, leverage, 
profitability (ROA), and growth opportunities (book-to-market), within the same two-digit SIC 
code, fiscal year, and whether the account restated was a core account or a non-core account.
9  
Table 3 shows that across all restatement characteristics, the mean values for restatements 
from weak rule of law countries are statistically not different from their matched sample of U.S. 
restatements except that they are more likely to issue a ‘stealth’ restatement than matched U.S. 
firms  and  are  economically  similar  in  their  materiality,  as  measured  by  magnitude.  The 
restatement duration of foreign firms is marginally higher (by one month) compared to that of 
the  U.S.  firms.  In  terms  of  the  accounts  restated,  foreign  firms  are  more  likely  to  report 
restatements related to the cost of good solds and special items relative to matched U.S. firms. 
In terms of restatement consequences, univariate evidence suggests that a firm is likely to 
face similar regulatory or legal action regardless of it’s country of origin. 7.8% of restatements 
by firms from weak rule of law countries are followed by securities litigation, which is not 
statistically different from 9.5% for the matched U.S. sample. The SEC investigates 7.8% of 
firms from weak rule of law countries and  8.6% for the matched sample of U.S. firms, the 
                                                           
9 Following Palmrose et al. (2004), we define core accounts as revenue recognition, cost of goods sold, operating 
expenses, and depreciation. All other accounts are considered non-core. 18 
 
difference is statistically insignificant. As a comparison, 7.4% and 10.2% of restatements by 
firms  from  strong  rule  of  law  countries  are  followed  by  securities  litigation  and  an  SEC 
investigation respectively, which are again not statistically different from their U.S. matched 
sample. In contrast, we observe significant differences in CEO turnover following restatements: 
CEO turnover for firms from both weak and strong rule of law countries are significantly lower 
than the CEO turnover rates for the corresponding matched samples of U.S. firms. 
 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Frequency of restatements and home country effect 
 
We first present restatement rates for U.S. listed foreign companies. Table 4, Panel A shows 
the percentage of firm-years restated for foreign companies (9.94%) is lower than that of the 
matched U.S. sample (15.31%). Foreign firms from weak rule of law countries restate their 
financial less frequently (7.64%) than firms from strong rule of law countries do (11.4%) and 
both are lower than the respective matched U.S. firm samples (14.60% and 15.76%). We use the 
following  multivariate  restatement  prediction  model  to  examine  foreign  firms’  likelihood  of 
restating financial statements as a function of firm-level and country-level characteristics.  
Restatementi,t = β0 + β1Weak_ROL c + β2EM_Indexi,t + β3-13Firm_Controlsi,t + β14-16 
Country_Controlsc,t + Industry FE + Year FE+ εi,t.               (1) 
The dependent variable Restatementi,t equals 1 if firm i restated financial statements for year 
t, and zero otherwise. Weak_ROLc is the primary variable of interest and equals 1 for firms from 
countries with a Rule of law score below our sample country median, zero otherwise. EM_Indexi,t 
is the earnings management index variable, as described in section 3.3. For comparison purposes, 
the same model is also estimated for the U.S. matched sample.  19 
 
In addition to the EM measures, we use a number of control variables hypothesized to affect 
the likelihood of a  restatement.  Firm  characteristics  that  can  affect  the propensity to  restate 
include  size,  leverage,  profitability,  and  growth  (Kinney  and  McDaniel  1989;  DeFond  and 
Jiambalvo 1991). We also include complexity, measured as the number of business segments, 
measures  of  the  firm’s  monitoring  environment:  auditor,  analyst  following,  and  institutional 
ownership. We control for whether the foreign firm reports using U.S. GAAP or using local 
GAAP with reconciliation to U.S. GAAP following the results in Lang et al. (2006). Finally, to 
mitigate  the  possibility  that  the  weak  rule  of  law  partition  is  capturing  differences  in  local 
accounting versus U.S. GAAP, capital market development, economic growth, or differences in 
auditor legal liability, all of which may be associated with the propensity to restate, we include 
these as  control  variables.  Finally,  we include  year and industry fixed effects  to  control  for 
unobservable time and industry factors that may affect restatement probability.  
Table 4, Panel B presents the results from estimating the logistic regression in equation (1). 
Model  (1)  shows  the  estimated  coefficient  using  the  pooled  foreign  and  U.S.  matched  firm 
sample.  The  coefficient  estimate  on  Foreign  firm  indicator  is  negative  and  statistically 
significant (coefficient = -0.381, p-value<0.001), suggesting that U.S. listed foreign firms are 
less likely to restate their financials relative to the matched U.S. sample. Model (2) shows the 
estimated  coefficients  using  only  the  foreign  firm  sample.  The  coefficient  on  Weak  ROL  is 
negative and statistically significant (coefficient = -0.541, p-value<0.001), indicating that firms 
from weak rule of law countries are less likely to restate their financials. It is worth noting  that 
the EM Index has no significant effect on the restatement probability (coefficient =0.048, p-
value=0.236) for foreign firms. This finding is in contrast to the matched sample of U.S. firms in 
Model  (3),  which  shows  a  greater  probability  of  restatements  when  firms  have  higher  EM 20 
 
(coefficient =0.092, p=0.004). In economic terms, this implies that firms from weak rule of law 
countries are 1.72 times less likely to restate their financials than firms from strong rule of law 
countries, after controlling for other determinants of restatement probability.
10 Consistent with 
prior  studies  (Kinney  and  McDaniel,  1989;  DeFond  and  Jimbalvo,  1991),  firm  size   and 
profitability (ROA) are all significant determinants of restatements. 
In Models (4) to (6), we use an alternative measure of reporting quality, the internal control 
(IC) effectiveness, as a predictor of restatements. As before, we estimate equation (1) for the 
foreign firms and the matched U.S. sample. However,  we limit our anlaysis to years after 2007 
since IC weakness disclosure became mandatory only after 2007 for foreign firms. The number 
of firm-year observations are therefore significantly reduced.
11 Model (4) shows the estimated 
coefficient using the pooled foreign and U.S. matched sample. As before, we find that U.S. listed 
foreign firms are less likely to restate (-0.619, p-value=0.004) relative to the matched U.S. firms 
sample. Model (5) shows the estimated coefficients using only the foreign firm sample.  We find 
that firms with weak home country rule of law are less likely to restate ( -1.287, p-value=0.007). 
The coefficient estimate on IC weakness is positive and significant (=0.802, p -value=0.018), 
suggesting that IC weaknesses are predictors of restateme nts. We find a similar effect on IC 
weakness for the foreign and matched U.S. sample (Models (5) and (6)). Overall, the results 
imply that firms from weak rule of law countries are less likely to restate than firms from strong 
                                                           
10 The 1.72 figure is based on the odds ratio of the estimated logit model. The odds ratio is calculated as exp 
β0 (= exp 
-0.541), suggesting that the odds of a weak rule of law firms versus a strong rule of law firm restating is 0.582. That is, 
a firm with a high rule of law has 1.72 (=1/0.582) greater odds of restating, all else equal.  
11 The sum of the number of observations in models (5) and (6) does not add up to the number of observations used in 
model (4). This is because when the sample is partitioned into two subsamples, some two-digit SIC industries with no 
variation in restatement rates drop out from the estimation.  21 
 
rule of law countries are and that the lower rate is not driven by weak rule of law-country firms 
having better earnings quality, as proxied by earnings management and IC effectiveness. 
4.2. Home country effect and restatements conditional on the level of earnings management 
The likelihood of restatement for U.S. listed foreign firms can vary across countries for two 
reasons.  The governance and compliance environment that exists with a given level of rule of 
law can affect (1) the likelihood of committing accounting irregularities and (2) likelihood of 
detecting and reporting the irregularities. Evidence discussed in the previous section suggests 
that foreign firms especially those from weaker rule of law countries, report fewer restatements. 
In our next set of tests, we attempt to distinguish between the two explanations – firms in weaker 
rule of law countries have better accounting quality versus these firms being less likely to report 
potential restatements – by examining the effect of home country rule of law conditional on the 
level of earnings management in reported earnings. Our intuition is that the companies engaging 
in earnings management would be more likely to restate and that the restatement outcome is 
more likely with a stronger private and public enforcement regime in that economy. Gong et al. 
(2009) follow a similar approach in assessing the relevance of internal control reports using 
measures of earnings quality. We test this prediction using the following model. 
Restatementi,t = β0 + β1EM_Indexi,t + β2-12Firm_Controlsi,t + β13-15Country_Controlsc,t + εi,t.  (2) 
The dependent variable Restatementi,t equals 1 if firm i restated its financial statements for year t, 
and  zero  otherwise.  In  order  to  compare  estimates  on  our  main  variable  of  interest,  the  β1 
coefficients, across the foreign firms and their matched U.S. sample, we estimate equation (2) as 
a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model. If restatements by firms from weak rule of law 
countries are as informative about accounting quality as the restatements of similar U.S. firms, 22 
 
we expect to find no significant difference in the β1 coefficients between the two samples. To the 
extent that restatements by firms from weak rule of law countries are less informative, we predict 
the coefficient to be less positive for these firms relative to the U.S. matched sample. 
Panel A of Table 5 presents the univariate result of the difference in restatement probability 
for firms in the highest and lowest earnings management quintiles. In all samples, firms in the 
high EM group restate much more frequently than do firms in the lower EM group. The last row 
reports the difference in restatement probability between the high and low EM groups for each 
subsample. The foreign firms sample shows a difference of 1.74%, whereas the U.S. matched 
firm sample shows a greater difference of 3.81% in restatement probability for firms in the 
highest and lowest EM quintiles. Among the foreign firms, the weak rule of law sample shows a 
0.40% difference in restatement probability, compared to 3.47 % for its U.S. matched sample 
and 3.04% for the strong rule of law group. 
Next, we examine the association between earnings quality and restatement likelihood  in a 
multivariate regression. Table 5, Panel B presents the results of the logit regression of equation 
(2). In Model (1), we estimate a  SUR model using the foreign firms  and the U.S. matched 
sample. The estimated coefficient on the EM index shows that there is a significant relation 
between earnings quality and restatement probability only in the U.S. matched firm sample, but 
not for the foreign firms. However, the F-test of the difference between the two coefficients is 
not significant at conventional levels. Next, we divide the foreign firms into high vs. low rule of 
law countries and compare the EM index coefficient to the estimates from their matched sample. 
Model (2) estimates a SUR model using the weak rule of law firms and their U.S. matched 
sample. The EM_Index coefficient is positive and significant only for the U.S. matched sample 
(=0.127, p-value=0.006), but not for the foreign firm sample. F-tests show that the difference in 23 
 
the  estimated  coefficient  is  statistically  significant  (p-value=0.038).  Model  (3)  shows  results 
using  the  strong  rule  of  law  country  sample  and  its  matched  U.S.  sample.  The  estimated 
coefficient on EM_Index is positive and significant for both the strong rule of law and U.S. 
matched sample; the difference in coefficients is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.839) 
across the two samples. The results suggest that, relative to similar U.S. firms, restatements by 
firms from weak rule of law countries are not as reflective of underlying accounting properties as 
they are for firms from strong rule of law countries.
12 The coefficient estimates on the control 
variables  show  that  more  frequent  restatements  are  associated  with  lower  profitability 
(ROA_current), sales growth, and having a non-big five auditor for foreign firms from weak rule 
of law countries. For those from strong rule of law countries, however, this relationship weakens 
and is often even reversed. For example, having a big-five auditor is often associated with a 
higher rate of restatements for strong rule of law firms. 
4.3 Home country effect and restatements conditional on the level of IC weaknesses 
A  common  criticism  of  the  earnings  management  measures  is  that  they  are  subject  to 
measurement error and hence are a noisy proxy for managerial discretion (Dechow et al. 2010). 
We therefore repeat the analyses above with internal control weakness as an alternative proxy for 
earnings quality following Doyle et al. (2007b), who find that control weaknesses are associated 
with low accruals quality.  
We collect internal control weakness (ICW) disclosure from Audit Analytics. Prior literature 
shows  that  good  internal  control  systems  increase  the  reliability  of  financial  reporting 
                                                           
12 In untabulated analysis, we repeat the analysis comparing the two foreign samples of strong and weak rule of law 
firms to each other, without the matched U.S firm sample. An F-test comparing the coefficient estimates on the EM 
variable shows that the difference is significant (χ2 (1) = 7.80, p-value=0.005). However, since foreign firms from 
strong and weak rule of law countries tend to have very different firm characteristics (Table 2, Panel B), inferences 
that can be drawn from this analysis are limited. 24 
 
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2008; Doyle et al. 2007a). For U.S. accelerated filers, ICW disclosure 
under Section 404 of Sarbanes-Oxley became mandatory from November 2004. For foreign-
private issuers, ICW disclosure was required only from the fiscal year ending on or after July 
2006.
13  We thus limit our analysis to firm-years starting from 2007 so that we only  consider 
periods when ICW reporting was mandatory. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the ICW 
disclosure for our sample. For the sample of firms from weak rule of law countries over th e 
2007-2010  period,  8%  of  firm -years  are  reported  as  having  internal  control  weaknesses 
compared with 3.9% for the U.S. matched sample 5.1% for firms from strong rule of law 
countries. 
We test whether the association between IC weakness and restatement lik elihood varies 
systematically by home country rule of law using the following equation.  
Restatementi,t = β0 + β1IC_Weaknessi,t-1+ β2-12Firm_Controlsi,t + β13-15Country_Controlsc,t + εi,t. (3) 
The dependent variable Restatementi,t equals 1 if firm i restated financial statements for year 
t,  and  zero  otherwise.
14 As before, we expect that the association with  IC  weakness and 
restatement probability to systematically vary by the level of home country rule of law. We 
compare estimates on  IC_Weakness across the foreign firms and their matched U.S. samples 
using a SUR model. To the extent that restatements by firms from weak rule of law countries are 
less informative, we predict the coefficient to be less positive for these firms relative to the U.S. 
matched sample. 
                                                           
13 See White & Case LLP “Guide for Foreign Private Issuers: Preparing your Upcoming Annual Report on Form 20-
F”. 
14 Since restatements almost always result in an ICW disclosure,  the β1 coefficient on IC_Weakness in equation (3) 
may be affected by a mechanical relationship between restatements and ICW disclosures. To avoid this, we align the 
restatement observations with ICW disclosures one year prior to the year of the restatement. For restatements that last 
for more than a single year, we use the ICW disclosure one year prior to the first restating year. 25 
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents univariate evidence on the difference in restatement probability 
for firms with weak internal controls and for those with strong internal controls. In each sub-
sample, the weak IC firms are always more likely to restate than are the strong IC firms. As seen 
with the EM measures, the difference in restatement probability between the weak and strong IC 
weakness firms is smallest for companies from weak rule of law countries and largest for the 
U.S. firms. The weak rule of law sample shows a 6.90% difference in the restatement probability 
for firms with and without an IC weakness. This difference increases to 13.13% for the strong 
rule of law group and 28.20% for the matched U.S. sample.
15, 16  
Table 6, Panel B presents the multivariate results of the logit regression using equation (2). 
As before, we estimate a SUR model and compare the coefficient estimates for the foreign and 
U.S. matched firms. Model (1) shows the estimated coefficients for U.S. listed foreign firms and 
the U.S. matched sample. For both samples, IC weaknesses are strongly related to restatement 
probability, but the relation is stronger for the U.S. sample (coefficient = 2.054, p-value<0.001). 
Model (2) shows the estimated coefficients for the U.S. listed firms  from weak rule of law 
countries and their U.S. matched sample. For weak rule of law countries, there is no significant 
relation between IC weakness and restatement probability (coefficient = 0.652, p-value = 0.221), 
while the relation is positive and significant (coefficient = 1.916, p-value<0.001) for the U.S. 
matched sample. F-tests show that the difference in the coefficients is statistically significant (p-
value=0.070). Model (3) shows the estimated coefficients using the strong rule of law sample 
                                                           
15 Since IC weaknesses are self-reported, the discretion inherent in IC disclosure may cause us to misclassify weak IC 
firms as strong IC firms. If firms from weak rule of law countries disproportionally misreport themselves as strong IC 
firms, this will cause a systematic bias in the classification. Gong et al. (2010) show that the effect of home country 
enforcement on ICW disclosure has been significantly reduced after SOX 404 in effect since 2007. Thus, we restrict 
our sample period to after 2007 when reporting under Section 404 was required for all accelerated filers. 
16 Non-accelerated filers, i.e., firms with public float shares less than $75 million , were exempt from Section 404 
even after 2007. In untabulated analysis, we drop firms that qualify as non-accelerated filers and limit our analysis to 
firms where ICW disclosures were mandated. Our inferences remain unchanged. 26 
 
and its matched U.S. sample. IC Weakness is a strong predictor of restatements for both the 
strong rule of law country sample and its matched U.S. firm sample and the F-test shows that the 
relationship is stronger for U.S. companies than it is for companies from strong rule of law 
countries. 
Overall, the results in sections 4.2 and 4.3 suggest that the restatements by companies in the 
weak  rule  of  law  country  sample  are  not  associated  with  the  two  measures  of  accounting 
weakness - earnings management and weak internal controls. On the other hand, for the strong 
rule of law sample and the U.S. matched sample, higher earnings management and poor internal 
controls are associated with a greater likelihood of restatements. These findings are consistent 
with the hypothesis that a lower frequency of restatements by firms from weak rule of law 
countries is indicative of opportunistic reporting. 
4.4 Disclosure choice and home country enforcement 
Finally,  we  examine  the  restatement  disclosure  medium  of  U.S.  listed  foreign  firms. 
Restatements may be announced in various ways: a separate filing (e.g., form 8-K or 6-K), a 
press release, amended financial statements (e.g., 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 20-F/A, or 40-F/A), regularly 
scheduled financial statements (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F, or 40-F), or non-timely filings (e.g., 10-NTK 
or equivalent). Restatements announced using a separate filing form, press release, or non-timely 
filing  draw  attention  to  the  restatement  and  its  severity  and  provide  the  restatement 
announcement with the greatest level of visibility. The other two types of restatements i.e., those 
announced  in  the  amended  statements  or  in  regularly  scheduled  financial  statements,  are 
sometimes referred to as ‘stealth restatements’, reflecting the lower visibility of the disclosure.  
Prior studies show that the manner in which a restatement is disclosed affects the investor 
reaction. Files (2011) and Myers et al. (2010) find that stealth restatements are associated with 27 
 
less negative stock reaction around the announcement date. Thus, if firms from countries with a 
weak rule of law use disclosure choice opportunistically, the choice to announce a restatement 
using more visible methods will be less associated with restatement magnitude. We test this 
hypothesis using the following model:  
Stealth Restatementi,t = β0 + β1Magnitudei + β2-12Firm Controli + β13-15 Country Controlc + εi,t.(4)  
The  dependent  variable,  Stealth  Restatementi,t,  equals  1  if  the  restatement  is  reported  in  a 
regularly scheduled financial statement (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F, or 40-F) or an amended financial 
statement (e.g., 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 20-F/A, or 40-F/A) without a separate filing or press release, 
and  zero  otherwise  (Files  et  al.  2009).  Magnitude  is  an  indicator  variable  equal  to  1  if  the 
restatement amount, as a percentage of total assets, is in the top quartile of all restatements, and 
zero otherwise. We also use  an alternative measure of restatement severity, the duration of the 
restatement, measured as the number of months restated.  
We estimate a SUR model to compare the coefficient estimate for firms from weak rule of 
law countries and their matched sample, and for firms from strong rule of law countries and their 
matched sample. Table 7 examines whether, conditional on a restatement, firms from weak rule 
of law countries exhibit opportunistic behavior when choosing the disclosure medium. We define 
opportunistic behavior as firms choosing to disclose the restatement via a less visible method – 
such as  in  the regularly scheduled financial report  filing (10-K, 10-Q,  20-F, or 40-F) or an 
amended regular filing (10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 20-F/A, or 40-F/A) – even when the restatement was 
material. The alternative, non-opportunistic behavior, is to disclose in a more visible, non-stealth 
manner. Non-stealth restatements are considered to be those that are announced via press release, 
a separate filing (8-K, 6-K), or a non-timely filing (NT 10-K or equivalent).  28 
 
The descriptive evidence in Table 3 shows that 73.3% of all restatements by weak rule of 
law countries are stealth restatements, compared to 48.3% of the restatements by the matched 
U.S. sample. Compared to the weak rule of law countries, strong rule of law countries are closer 
to their matched sample of U.S. firms in the extent to which they use a less visible disclosure 
medium (61.5% vs. 42.6%).  
Panels B and C of Table 7 present the results of estimating equation (4). The main variable 
of  interest  is  the  coefficient  on  restatement  magnitude  (β1).  Panel  B  measures  restatement 
magnitude as the equity impact of the restatement as a percentage of total assets, and Panel C 
measures  magnitude  as  the  number  of  months  affected  by  the  restatement.  Since  the  SEC 
requires restatements that have a material impact to be disclosed using a visible medium like an 
8-K, we expect the restatement magnitude to be negatively associated with the likelihood of 
using a stealth disclosure (β1<0).  
Coefficient estimates show that the association between restatement magnitude and stealth 
disclosure varies systematically across the two groups of countries. Model (1) of Panel B shows 
that β1 coefficients are negative and significant for both foreign and U.S. matched firms and the 
difference in the coefficients is statistically significant (F-test =3.22, p-value= 0.073). Model (2) 
shows that the magnitude and statistical significance of the difference in the β1 coefficient for the 
weak rule of law-country sample and its U.S. matched firms is even greater (F-test =5.61, p-
value= 0.018). In contrast, the strong rule of law-country sample shows no significant difference 
in the β1 coefficients from their U.S. matched firms (F-test =0.36, p-value= 0.549). 
Panel C results show a negative relationship between restatement duration stealth disclosure 
choices consistent with materiality playing a role in the decision. Model (1) results show that 
foreign  and  U.S.  domestic  firms  do  not  differ  in  their  disclosure  choice  conditional  on 29 
 
restatement  duration.  However,  Model  (2)  shows  that  in  weak  rule  of  law  countries,  the 
association between restatement magnitude and stealth restatement is insignificant, while for the 
matched U.S. firm sample, the association between restatement magnitude and the likelihood of 
using stealth disclosure is negative and significant (= -0.080, p-value= 0.004). This is in contrast 
to the strong rule of law sample and its U.S. matched sample, which shows that the difference in 
the  coefficients  is  statistically  not  significant  (F-test=  0.01,  p-value  =  0.929).  These  results 
confirm that the tendency to avoid visible disclosure choices for restatements is greater when 
firms are from a weak rule of law country.  
 
5. ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 PCAOB enforcement and the restatement probability of foreign firms 
In this section, we examine the role of U.S. regulatory monitors in shaping the reporting 
behavior  of  foreign  firms  in  the  U.S.  We  examine  the  role  of  U.S.  enforcement  using  the 
variation in the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board’s (PCAOB’s) ability to conduct an 
investigation of the auditors of foreign firms listed in the U.S.  
The PCAOB was established after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), which required 
all audit firms auditing a publicly listed U.S. firm to register with the PCAOB. Once registered, 
the  audit  firms  become  subject  to  PCAOB’s  periodic  inspections,  even  if  the  audit  firm  is 
domiciled outside of the U.S. In practice, many individual audit firms are yet to allow such an 
inspection  and  in  certain  jurisdictions,  local  regulators  have  denied  PCAOB  the  ability  to 
conduct inspections  (e.g., China, Switzerland, and certain EU member states).
17 We use  this 
                                                           
17 Carcello et al. (2010) reports that as of April 2010, 38% of the firms registered with the PCAOB are audit firms 
domiciled in foreign countries. When a registered audit firm refuses to allow an inspection, the PCAOB has the 
statutory authority to deregister the audit firm. The board, however, has chosen a measured approach. In 2010, the 
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variation in PCAOB’s reach across foreign countries and auditors to test how U.S. enforcement 
can affect reporting quality for foreign companies. 
In  Table  8,  we  present  the  results  of  estimating  the  logit  regression  in  Model  (2)  after 
partitioning  the  sample  by  whether  firms  are  audited  by  auditors  that  allow  PCAOB 
inspections.
18 Panel A shows that in the weak rule of law sample, restatement probability is 
positively  associated  with  earnings  management  when  PCAOB  inspection  is  allowed,  but 
negatively associated when PCAOB inspection is not allowed. This suggests that the weaker 
association between earnings management and restatement likelihood in weak rule of law 
countries observed in Table 5 is driven by firms with weak U.S. enforcement i.e., auditors that 
do not allow PCAOB inspections. 
Panel B results show that in countries with  a strong rule of law, the positive association 
between earnings management and restatement likelihood is driven by firms that allow PCAOB 
inspections. Taken together, the findings suggests that the differences in the association between 
EM and restatement probability for foreign firms and the matched U.S. sample is driven by 1) 
foreign firms with auditors where PCAOB were not allowed to perform inspections for the weak 
rule of law sample, and 2) foreign firms with auditors where PCAOB were allowed to perform 
inspections for the strong rule of law sample. This suggests that U.S. enforcement, together with 
stronger home country institutions, is an important determinant of restatement likelihood. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
board publicly disclosed the names of the audit firms that refused to be inspected and delayed the deadline for them 
to allow inspections. 
18 We obtain the list of countries that allow PCAOB inspections  from the international inspection program progress 
report downloaded from the PCAOB’s webpage. The report contains the list of non-U.S. jurisdictions where PCAOB 
has conducted inspections as of  December 2011. 31 
 
5.2 Alternative measure of country-level institutions 
Finally, we examine the sensitivity of our analysis to an alternative measure of country 
level institutional quality that we have measured using the rule of law. Following Leuz et al. 
(2003), we measure the strength of a country’s law enforcement institutions using the mean score 
of three law enforcement variables identified in La Porta et al. (1998). The three enforcement 
variables include the original rule of law measure, and two additional proxies based on assessments 
from risk rating agencies that attempt to capture: (1) the efficiency and integrity of the country’s 
judicial system and (2) the degree of government corruption. 
Panel B of Table 9 reports the results of three logistic regression models in which we use 
the  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998)  enforcement  measure  and  partition  the  country  into  high  and  low 
enforcement countries. Similar to the analysis in Table 5, we find that the estimated coefficients 
on the EM index are significantly associated with restatement likelihood only for the matched 
U.S. firms. Using foreign firms in weak enforcement countries in model (2), we find that the 
EM_index  coefficient  is  positive  and  significant  only  for  the  U.S.  matched  sample 
(coefficient=0.134, p-value=0.003). F-tests show that the difference in the estimated coefficient is 
statistically  significant  (p-value=0.033).  In  model  (3),  using  foreign  firms  from  strong 
enforcement countries and the matched U.S. sample, we find that difference in the estimated 
coefficient on EM_index is not statistically significant. Our results therefore remain unchanged 
using alternative measures of enforcement. In untabulated results, we find that our analysis of 
internal controls is also robust to the La Porta et al. (1998) measure of law enforcement. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
We  study  restatements  by  foreign  firms  listed  in  the  U.S.,  compare  the  extent  of 
restatements by the foreign firms to that of domestic U.S. firms, and examine the role of home 32 
 
country characteristics on the likelihood of the foreign firms restating their financials. On the one 
hand,  restatements  reflect  weak  accounting  quality.  On  the  other  hand,  a  restatement 
announcement  implies  than  an  accounting  error  or  irregularity  was  identified  and  corrected, 
reflecting that internal and external governance mechanisms like internal controls and external 
audit performed their expected roles. Results in the paper suggest that foreign firms listed in the 
U.S. restate lesser than comparable U.S. firms and this difference is not because the foreign firms 
have superior accounting quality but because of opportunistic avoidance of issuing a restatement. 
The difference with U.S. firms is driven primarily by firms that originate from countries with 
weaker institutions.  
Our  results  suggest  that  foreign  firms  listed  in  the  U.S.  are  subject  to  a  less  rigorous 
monitoring and enforcement regime than domestic U.S. firms. Further, weaker institutions in the 
firm’s  country  of  origin  lowers  financial  reporting  quality  of  foreign  firms  accessing  U.S. 
markets despite a common set of U.S. rules and enforcement that apply to all foreign firms. The 
implication of these findings is that restatements are a less accurate measure of the extent of 
reporting problems in an international setting compared to U.S. domestic firms. An accurate 
reflection  of  accounting  quality  through  restatement  reporting  is  a  necessary  information 
mechanism  for  the  SEC  and  investors  to  hold  managers  and  auditors  accountable.  Fewer 
restatements can lead to a lower level of scrutiny which is a concern from an investor protection 
point  of  view. 33 
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APPENDIX A VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
(i=firm, c=country, r=restatement, t=year) 
Variable   Description 
Earnings management   
 EM1i,t 
: : Small positive income 
Indicator variables that take a value of 1 if the firm's net income available to 
common shareholders, scaled by total assets, falls between 0 and 0.01, zero 
otherwise. 
EM2i,t 
: : |Accruals|/|CFO| 
Ratio of the absolute value of total accruals to the absolute value of operating cash 
flows. Total accruals are calculated as (Δ Current Assets - Δ Cash) - (Δ Current 
Liabilities - Δ Current Debt - Δ Tax Payable) - Δ Depreciation. 
 
EM3 i,t 
: Accruals quality 
The standard deviation of the residual from a firm-level regression of prior and 
future operating cash flow (Dechow and Dichev (2002) and modified in Wysocki 
(2009)). The regression model is estimated cross-sectionally each year for each 
industry (two-digit SIC-code). The measure captures estimation errors in the 
accounting process by measuring how well accruals map into cash flow realizations. 
 
EM4i,t 
:  -Corr(ΔAccrual,Δ CFO) 
Negative value of the Spearman correlation of the change in total accruals to the 
change in operating cash flows, calculated on a rolling basis over the three prior 
years.  
 
EM Indexi,t  Average percentile rank for each firm for the year across the four (or as many as 
are available) measures of earnings management. Each year, all firms are ranked 
on each measure and percentile rank is assigned to the firm for all four (or all 
available) measures. Higher values indicate higher earnings management.  
Firm characteristics   
Sizei,t  Natural log of total assets.  
Leveragei,t  Long term and short term debt, scaled by total assets. 
ROAi,t  Income before extraordinary items, scaled by total assets.  
Book-to-Marketi,t  Book to market ratio. 
Big Five Auditori,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the big 5 audit firms, 
zero otherwise. 
Analyst coveragei,t  Number of analysts covering the firm at any point during the year. 
Institutional ownershipi,t  Percentage of float shares owned by the U.S. institutional investors. Non-float 
shares are from Thompson Datastream. 
Sales growthi,t  % increase in sales from prior year. 
Segmenti,t  Natural log of the number of the firm's business segments. 
Reporting_Standardi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if firms use U.S. GAAP or IFRS without 
reconciliation, 0 if firms use local GAAP with reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. 
IC Weaknessi,t  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm reported an internal control weakness for 
the year, prior to identifying the need to restate the financials, zero otherwise. 
Firms with auditors 
allowing PCAOB inspection 
Indicator variable equal to 1 if firms are audited by audit companies that are not 
disclosed as companies that deny PCAOB inspection, 0 otherwise (PCAOB 
webpage accessed December 2011). 
Restatement characteristics   
Stealth disclosurer  Indicator variable equal to 1 if the restatement is reported in a regularly scheduled 
financial statements (10-K, 10-Q, 20-F, or 40-F) or in amended financial 
statements (e.g., 10-K/A, 10-Q/A, 20-F/A, or 40-F/A) without a separate filing or 
press release, and zero otherwise. 
Magnituder  The dollar amount of equity restated, scaled by total assets. 
Litigationr 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if there is an identified litigation related to the 
restatement within one year after the restatement announcement, zero otherwise. 38 
 
 
Core_Accountr 
Durationr 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the restatement impacts the core net operating 
income of the firm, and zero otherwise. 
The number of months the restatement event affected the financial statements. 
SEC investigationr  Indicator variable equal to one if an SEC investigation relating to the restatement is 
identified by Audit Analytics, zero otherwise.  
CEO turnoverr  An indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO leaves his post within a year following 
the restatement. 
Country characteristics   
Weak rule of lawc  Indicator variable equal to one if the rule of law index is below the country sample 
median (=1.64). The rule of law index is from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators created by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. (2003)) and used in La 
Porta et al. (2006)) Rule of law measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society in the year 2000.  These include 
perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of 
contracts.  
Accounting differencec  Measure of the difference between two local accounting standards from Bae et al. 
(2008). Measure is constructed based on a survey examining the extent to which 
local accounting standards deviate from IFRS for a list of 21 accounting rules 
(GAAP 2001). Two rules are considered similar when the rules of both countries 
comply with IFRS. Two countries that follow local standards that are not 
compliant with IFRS are considered to have similar rules only if they derive from 
the same legal origin. A higher score implies a greater difference. 
Country market capc,t  Market capitalization in $ billion, by country and year, obtained from Standard and 
Poor’s Global Stock Markets Factbook 2010.  
Country GDP growthc,t  Percentage GDP growth by country and year, obtained from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit.  
Auditor legal liabilityc  Liability standard for accountant measure from La Porta et al. (2006). 
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TABLE 1: SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVE  
Panel A: Distribution of cross-listed firms and restatements by home-country of domicile, firms from weak 
rule of law countries 
WEAK RULE OF LAW COUNTRIES
Total number of 
restated firm-years
Total number of 
cross-listed firm-years
% of restating 
firm-years
Argentina 4 113 4%
Brazil 11 84 13%
Chile 4 162 2%
China 75 689 11%
Colombia 1 2 50%
Dominican Republic 1 4 25%
France 29 234 12%
Ghana 0 3 0%
Greece 2 142 1%
India 14 111 13%
Indonesia 1 21 5%
Israel 32 769 4%
Italy 4 78 5%
Korea (Rep.) 9 94 10%
Malaysia 0 1 0%
Mexico 5 199 3%
Panama 0 16 0%
Peru 4 24 17%
Philippines 7 20 35%
Portugal 0 19 0%
South Africa 15 96 16%
Spain 6 72 8%
Taiwan 8 84 10%
Thailand 0 4 0%
Turkey 0 10 0%
Venezuela 2 10 20%
Total Weak ROL 234 3061 8%
US Matched Sample 447 3061 15%
Total Weak ROL & US Matched 681 6122 11%  
 This table shows the number of firm-year observations for each country, and the number of firm-years subsequently 
restated. Weak countries are countries whose rule of law index score (La Porta et al. (2006)) is below the country 
sample median (=1.64), while strong countries are those with an index score at or above the sample country median. 
Offshore centers include the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Virgin Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, the Cayman Islands, 
the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea. Since these countries are either British or Dutch territories or have a 
legal system that follows the British judicial system, we classify them as strong rule of law countries. 40 
 
TABLE 1 (CONTINUED) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of cross-listed firms and restatements by home-country of domicile, firms from 
strong rule of law countries 
 
STRONG  RULE OF LAW 
COUNTRIES
Total number of 
restated firm-years
Total number of 
cross-listed firm-years
% of restating 
firm-years
Australia 25 158 16%
Austria 0 7 0%
Belgium 2 18 11%
Canada 200 1819 11%
Czech Rep. 0 1 0%
Denmark 0 25 0%
Finland 6 39 15%
Germany 15 180 8%
Hong Kong 22 258 9%
Hungary 5 19 26%
Iceland 3 9 33%
Ireland 15 210 7%
Offshore Centers 70 512 14%
Japan 20 259 8%
Kazahkstan 4 4 100%
Luxembourg 9 78 12%
Netherlands 27 269 10%
New Zealand 6 22 27%
Norway 2 33 6%
Poland 0 2 0%
Puerto Rico 0 4 0%
Russia 7 45 16%
Singapore 9 60 15%
Sweden 2 62 3%
Switzerland 41 204 20%
United Kingdom 60 532 11%
Total Strong ROL 550 4829 11%
Total US Matched Sample 761 4829 16%
Total Strong ROL & US Matched 1311 9658 14%
Total All Firms (Weak, Strong, US) 1992 15780 13%  
This table shows the number of firm-year observations for each country, and the number of firm-years subsequently 
restated. Weak countries are the countries whose rule of law index score (La Porta et al. (2006)) is below the country 
sample median (=1.64.), while strong countries are those with an index score at or above the sample country median. 
Offshore centers include the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Virgin Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, the Cayman Islands, 
the Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea. Since these countries are either British or Dutch territories or have a 
legal system that follows the British judicial system, we classify them as strong rule of law countries. 41 
 
Earning management (+)
EM1: Small Positive Income 3061 0.058 3061 0.067 4829 0.059 4829 0.079 0.020** 0.000***
EM2: |Accruals|/|CFO| 2446 1.071 2421 0.834 3917 0.888 3782 0.808 0.000*** 0.003***
EM3: Dechow/Dichev 2535 0.025 2604 0.016 3927 0.021 4016 0.017 0.001*** 0.064*
EM 4: -Corr(ΔAccrual, ΔCFO) 1857 -0.172 2165 -0.231 3232 -0.185 3424 -0.232 0.007*** 0.006***
EM Index 3061 3.139 3061 2.961 4829 2.975 4829 2.962 0.000*** 0.652
TABLE 2:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: CROSS-LISTED FIRMS AND MATCHED U.S. FIRM SAMPLE, 2000-2010 
Panel A: Firm characteristics 
Variables
P-values
(1)=(2)
P-values
(3)=(4)
n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean
Firm characteristics
Size 3061 6.592 3061 6.638 4829 7.191 4829 7.257 0.449 0.188
Leverage 3061 0.205 3061 0.201 4829 0.203 4829 0.211 0.513 0.019**
ROA 3061 0.005 3061 -0.034 4829 -0.015 4829 -0.012 0.000*** 0.272
Book-to-market 3061 0.770 3061 0.649 4829 0.662 4829 0.641 0.000*** 0.046**
Governance variables
IC weakness 876 0.080 1025 0.039 1212 0.051 1295 0.042 0.000*** 0.303
Big Five Auditor 3061 0.659 3061 0.794 4829 0.691 4829 0.816 0.000*** 0.000***
Analyst Coverage 3061 4.027 3061 9.203 4829 6.469 4829 10.987 0.000*** 0.000***
Institutional Ownership 3061 0.181 3061 0.607 4829 0.201 4829 0.619 0.000*** 0.000***
% of firms using US GAAP 3061 0.646 3061 0.995 4829 0.809 4829 0.994 0.000*** 0.000***
% firms with auditors allowing PCAOB inspection 3061 0.737 3061 1.000 4829 0.849 4829 1.000 0.000*** 0.000***
(1) 
Weak rule of law 
country
(3) 
Strong rule of law 
country
(2) 
Match US firms 
: Weak
(4) 
Match US firms
: Strong
 
Panel B: Earnings management measures 
 
Notes: This table presents the firm-characteristics of the foreign cross-listed firms (by level of home country rule of law) and their matched U.S. firms. 
Specification (1) shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms from weak legal rule of law countries and specification (2) shows the equivalent 
for  the  matched  sample  of  U.S.  firms.  Specification  (3)  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  for  firms  from  strong  legal  rule  of  law  countries,  and 
specification (4) presents the equivalent for their U.S. firm matched sample. The matched U.S. sample is selected by performing a propensity score 
match on size, leverage, performance, and growth, within the same two-digit SIC code and fiscal year. The number of observations for each variable is 
listed under "n". % of firms using U.S. GAAP is the percentage of firms that report using  U.S. GAAP or IFRS without reconciliation (as opposed to 
local GAAP with reconciliation to U.S. GAAP). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. P-values are based on t-tests for differences in mean. 42 
 
TABLE 3: RESTATEMENT CHARACTERISTICS OF CROSS-LISTED FIRMS AND MATCHED U.S. FIRM SAMPLE, 2000-2010 
  
P-values
(1)=(2)
P-values
(3)=(4)
n Mean n Mean n Mean n Mean
Restatement characteristics
Stealth Disclosure 116 0.733 116 0.483 244 0.615 244 0.426 0.000 0.000
Magnitude (% of total assets) 116 -0.014 116 -0.015 243 -0.013 242 -0.004 0.751 0.001
Duration (# of months) 116 28.5 116 27.100 244 27.5 244 26.300 0.000 0.000
Restatement accounts
Core account
Revenue recognition 116 0.164 116 0.216 244 0.135 244 0.168 0.317 0.314
Cost of goods sold 116 0.095 116 0.147 244 0.070 244 0.127 0.228 0.033
Operating expenses 116 0.086 116 0.121 244 0.148 244 0.119 0.391 0.352
Depreciation 116 0.069 116 0.052 244 0.066 244 0.045 0.583 0.323
Non-core account
Merger-related 116 0.129 116 0.147 244 0.156 244 0.148 0.705 0.801
Special items 116 0.224 116 0.198 244 0.262 244 0.152 0.631 0.003
Stock option/compensation 116 0.121 116 0.164 244 0.123 244 0.131 0.350 0.786
Related party/subsidiary 116 0.078 116 0.060 244 0.082 244 0.078 0.606 0.868
Other 116 0.336 116 0.345 244 0.328 244 0.336 0.890 0.848
Consequences
Litigation 116 0.078 116 0.095 244 0.074 244 0.107 0.642 0.207
SEC Investigation 116 0.078 116 0.086 244 0.102 244 0.102 0.812 1.000
CEO Turnover 116 0.009 116 0.060 244 0.041 244 0.098 0.031 0.013
(1) 
Weak rule of law 
country
(3) 
Strong rule of law 
country
(2) 
Matched US firms
:Weak
(4) 
Matched US firms
: Strong
 
Notes: This table presents the firm-characteristics of the foreign cross-listed firms (by level of the home country rule of law index) and the 
matched U.S. firms. We use the country sample median of the rule of law index (=1.64) to classify firms into those from strong and weak rule 
of law countries. The rule of law index is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators created by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. (2003) and 
used in La Porta et al. (2006)). Specification (1) shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of firms from weak legal rule of law countries 
and specification (2) shows the equivalent for the matched sample of U.S. firms. Specification (3) shows the descriptive statistics for the firms 
from strong legal rule of law countries, and specification (4) presents the equivalent for their U.S. firm matched sample. The matched U.S. 
restatement sample is selected by performing a propensity score match on size, leverage, performance, and growth, within the same two-digit 
SIC code, restatement accounts (core vs. non-core) and fiscal year.  The number of observations for each variable is listed under "n". All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. See Table 1 for the list of countries with strong and weak and strong rules of law. P-values are based on t-
tests for differences in mean. 43 
 
TABLE 4: RESTATEMENT PROBABILITY OF FOREIGN FIRMS LISTED IN U.S. 
 
   Panel A: Percentage of restatements by level of home country rule of law   
All Weak Rule of Law Strong Rule of Law
Foreign firms
9.94%
 (N=7,890)
7.64%
(N= 3,061)
11.39%
(N=4,829)
US matched firms
15.31%
(N=7,890)
14.60%
(N=3,061)
15.76%
(N=4,829)
Difference
 [p-value]
5.37%
 [0.000]
6.96%
 [0.000]
4.37% 
[0.000]  
 
Panel B: Likelihood of restatements and home country rule of law  
Model: Restateit =  β0+ β1*Weak_ROLc+ β2*EM_Indexit+ β3*IC_Weaknessit + β4-17* Controlsit  + Year 
FE+ Industry FE + εit              (1)   
 
D=restate D=restate D=restate D=restate D=restate D=restate
(1)
Foreign & US 
matched firms
(2) 
Foreign firms
(3) 
US matched firms
(4)
Foreign & US 
matched firms
(5) 
Foreign firms
(6) 
US matched 
firms
Foreign firm indicator -0.381*** -0.619***
[0.000] [0.004]
Weak rule of law -0.541*** -1.287***
[0.005] [0.007]
EM Index 0.071*** 0.048 0.092***
[0.005] [0.236] [0.004]
IC Weakness 1.507*** 0.802** 2.064***
[0.000] [0.018] [0.000]
Firm Controls
Size -0.041 -0.066* -0.006 -0.139** -0.073 -0.117
[0.139] [0.094] [0.895] [0.044] [0.434] [0.319]
Leverage 0.384 0.109 0.514 0.839 -0.160 1.150
[0.120] [0.785] [0.110] [0.119] [0.823] [0.141]
ROA_current -1.093*** -1.128*** -1.032*** -0.539 -1.420 -0.197
[0.000] [0.002] [0.010] [0.431] [0.192] [0.827]
ROA_lagged 0.568* 0.279 0.572 1.502* 2.197 1.609
[0.055] [0.475] [0.188] [0.094] [0.120] [0.182]
Book-to-Market 0.077 0.053 0.093 0.227 0.198 0.308
[0.297] [0.644] [0.343] [0.159] [0.408] [0.175]
Big five auditor -0.034 -0.102 0.002 -0.366* -1.083*** 0.000
[0.695] [0.518] [0.983] [0.073] [0.000] [0.999]
Analyst coverage 0.003 0.018 -0.010 -0.013 -0.000 -0.029
[0.664] [0.144] [0.368] [0.383] [0.989] [0.195]
Institutional ownership 0.312*** 0.277 0.328** -0.040 -0.001 -0.132
[0.006] [0.210] [0.016] [0.840] [0.997] [0.593]
Sales growth 0.140 0.128 0.049 0.005 0.467 -0.324
[0.158] [0.361] [0.729] [0.982] [0.162] [0.403]
Segments 0.042 0.122 0.055 -0.278* 0.030 -0.543**
[0.629] [0.352] [0.653] [0.094] [0.899] [0.018]
Reporting standard 0.034 0.467 1.115 -0.850
[0.826] [0.339] [0.171] [0.446]
(Continued)  44 
 
 
TABLE 4: RESTATEMENT PROBABILITY OF FOREIGN FIRMS LISTED IN U.S. 
(CONTINUED) 
 
D=restate D=restate D=restate D=restate D=restate D=restate
(1)
Foreign & US 
matched firms
(2) 
Foreign firms
(3) 
US matched firms
(4)
Foreign & US 
matched firms
(5) 
Foreign firms
(6) 
US matched 
firms
Country Controls
Accounting difference 0.481 0.150
[0.262] [0.853]
Country market cap 0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000*
[0.014] [0.038] [0.847] [0.063]
Country GDP growth  8.148*** -10.841** 14.782*** -8.288
[0.001] [0.037] [0.006] [0.143]
Auditor legal liability 0.116 0.461
[0.754] [0.530]
Constant -3.577*** -4.475*** -1.869* -1.987*** -4.504*** 1.204
[0.000] [0.000] [0.099] [0.000] [0.003] [0.497]
Pseudo R-squared 0.060 0.061 0.067 0.102 0.131 0.143
# obs 15,780 7,890 7,890 4,408 2,088 2,307
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES  
Notes: Panel A shows the percentage of firm-years in each sample group that subsequently report a restatement. 
Panel B reports the estimation from a logistic regression of equation (1). The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable  that  takes  a  value  of  1  if  the  firm's  financial  statements  were  restated  subsequently,  zero  otherwise. 
Weak_rule of law is an indicator variable equal to 1 for firms from countries with a weak rule of law and zero 
otherwise. We use the country sample median of the rule of law index (=1.64) to classify firms into those from 
strong and weak rule of law countries. The rule of law index is from the Worldwide Governance Indicators created 
by  the  World  Bank  (Kaufmann  et  al.  (2003)  and  used  in  La  Porta  et  al.  (2006)).  EM_Index  is  the  earnings 
management index variable described in Appendix A. IC_Weakness is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm 
reported  an  internal  control  weakness  for  the  year,  prior  to  identifying  the  need  to  restate  the  financials,  zero 
otherwise.  All  other  variables  are  defined  in  Appendix  A.  Standard  errors  are  clustered  at  the  firm  level. 
Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 5: HOME COUNTRY RULE OF LAW AND RESTATEMENT PROBABILITY, CONDITIONAL ON EARNINGS 
MANAGEMENT 
Panel A: Percentage of restatements by level of EM and home country rule of law 
Foreign firms 
(N=7,890)
US matched firms
(N=7,890)
Foreign firms
: weak  rule of law countries
(N=3,061)
US matched firms
(N=3,061)
Foreign firms 
: strong  rule of law countries
 (N=4,829)
US matched firms
(N=4,829)
EM= High (5th Quintile) 11.25% 17.16% 7.56% 17.69% 13.82% 16.85%
EM= Low (1st Quintile) 9.50% 13.36% 7.16% 14.22% 10.78% 12.83%
Difference [p-value] 1.74% [0.113] 3.81% [0.003] 0.40% [0.791] 3.47% [0.099] 3.04% [0.043] 4.02% [0.011]  
Panel B: Likelihood of restatements conditional on EM, by home country rule of law 
Model: Restateit = β0+ β1*EM_Indexit+ β2-15*Controlsit + Year FE+ Industry FE +εit.                (2) 
Foreign Firms US Matched firms Weak rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Weak Strong rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Strong
EM_Index 0.037 0.092*** -0.038 0.127*** 0.086* 0.073**
[0.358] [0.004] [0.555] [0.006] [0.082] [0.047]
F- test
 [Prob > χ2]
Firm Controls
Size -0.051 -0.006 -0.014 0.078 -0.063 -0.056
[0.182] [0.895] [0.809] [0.250] [0.237] [0.258]
Leverage 0.099 0.514 0.379 0.136 0.160 0.706**
[0.808] [0.110] [0.561] [0.764] [0.755] [0.046]
ROA_current -1.162*** -1.032*** -2.223*** -0.259 -0.758* -1.500***
[0.002] [0.010] [0.001] [0.634] [0.080] [0.002]
ROA_lagged 0.241 0.572 0.937 0.371 -0.337 0.722
[0.535] [0.188] [0.232] [0.516] [0.473] [0.208]
Book-to-market 0.034 0.093 0.148 0.114 0.053 0.086
[0.768] [0.343] [0.468] [0.399] [0.710] [0.474]
Big five auditor -0.100 0.002 -1.184*** 0.184 0.642*** -0.114
[0.528] [0.983] [0.000] [0.302] [0.004] [0.431]
Analyst coverage 0.018 -0.010 -0.003 -0.017 0.023 -0.005
[0.135] [0.368] [0.882] [0.238] [0.104] [0.659]
Institutional ownership 0.263 0.328** 0.199 0.226 0.282 0.389**
[0.237] [0.016] [0.553] [0.216] [0.301] [0.012]
Sales growth 0.132 0.049 0.540** 0.003 -0.050 0.075
[0.347] [0.729] [0.018] [0.987] [0.785] [0.657]
Segments 0.133 0.055 0.261 -0.265 0.035 0.252**
[0.306] [0.653] [0.158] [0.135] [0.842] [0.033]
Reporting standard 0.121 0.467 0.035 1.029 -0.091 0.283
[0.439] [0.339] [0.899] [0.324] [0.640] [0.618]
(Continued)
χ2 (1) =4.32 [0.038] χ2 (1) =0.04 [0.839]
(2) (3)
χ2 (1) =1.15  [0.284]
(1)
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
Foreign Firms US Matched firms Weak rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Weak Strong rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Strong
Country Controls
Accounting difference 0.145 0.047 0.874*
[0.738] [0.959] [0.088]
Country market cap 0.000*** -0.000** 0.000*** -0.000 0.000 -0.000*
[0.003] [0.038] [0.006] [0.299] [0.866] [0.057]
Country GDP growth  5.218** -10.841** 5.093 -10.756 5.096 -12.133
[0.020] [0.037] [0.231] [0.112] [0.210] [0.140]
Auditor legal liability 0.312 1.296 -0.005
[0.413] [0.163] [0.990]
Constant -4.825*** -1.869* -5.777*** -3.156* -5.508*** -0.983
[0.000] [0.099] [0.000] [0.062] [0.000] [0.523]
# obs 7890 7890 3061 3061 4829 4829
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.067 0.131 0.075 0.071 0.071
Country controls (Appendix) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3)
 
Notes: Panel A shows the percentage of firm-years in each sample group that subsequently report a restatement, split into the highest and lowest quintiles of the 
EM index. The calculation of the EM Index is described in Appendix A. Panel B reports the estimation from a logistic regression of equation (2). The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm's financial statements were restated subsequently, and zero otherwise. We use the country 
sample median of the rule of law index (=1.64) to classify firms into those from strong and weak rule of law countries. The rule of law index is from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators created by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. (2003) and used in La Porta et al. (2006)). Coefficient estimates and p -values (in 
parentheses) are from seemingly unrelated regressions of restatement probability on EM index and other controls. F-tests compare the coefficients of the 
EM_Index variable for the weak rule of law country sample and their U.S. matched sample (Models (1) and (2)), as well as the strong rule of law country sample 
and its matched sample (Models (3) and (4)). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values are based on 
t-tests for differences in mean. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE 6: HOME COUNTRY RULE OF LAW AND RESTATEMENT PROBABILITY, CONDITIONAL ON IC WEAKNESS 
Panel A: Percentage of restatements by level of IC weakness and home country rule of law 
Foreign firms
(N=2,088)
Us matched firms
(N=2,320)
Foreign: weak  rule of law
(N=876)
US matched: Weak
(N=1,025)
Foreign: strong  rule of law
 (N=1,212)
US matched: Strong
(N=1,295)
Weak internal controls 13.64% 37.89% 10.00% 35.00% 17.74% 40.00%
Stong internal controls 3.99% 5.93% 3.10% 6.80% 4.61% 5.24%
Difference [p-value] 9.65% [0.000] 31.96% [0.000] 6.9% [0.003] 28.2% [0.000] 13.13% [0.000] 34.76% [0.000]  
Panel B: Likelihood of restatement conditional on IC weakness, by home country rule of law 
Model: Restateit =  β0+  β1*IC_Weaknessit+ β2-17*Controlsit + Year FE+ Industry FE +εit.                            (3) 
Foreign firms US Matched firms
Foreign firms
: weak rule of law countries US matched firms: Weak
Foreign firms
: strong rule of law countries US matched firms: Strong
IC Weakness 0.785** 2.054*** 0.652 1.916*** 1.345*** 2.528***
[0.030] [0.000] [0.221] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000]
F- test
 [Prob > χ2]
EM_Index 0.008 0.208** -0.310* 0.295** 0.205* 0.114
[0.933] [0.014] [0.085] [0.012] [0.051] [0.312]
Firm Controls
Size -0.028 -0.120 -0.368* -0.104 0.104 -0.120
[0.752] [0.299] [0.074] [0.499] [0.382] [0.430]
Leverage -0.225 0.984 1.091 0.546 -0.675 1.709*
[0.759] [0.216] [0.450] [0.596] [0.463] [0.088]
ROA_current -1.213 -0.093 -0.285 2.097 -1.872 -2.139**
[0.266] [0.916] [0.885] [0.115] [0.133] [0.049]
ROA_lagged 1.895 1.697 4.226 -0.787 0.880 4.845***
[0.164] [0.164] [0.305] [0.594] [0.604] [0.005]
Book-to-market 0.158 0.259 0.370 0.303 0.133 0.222
[0.523] [0.252] [0.343] [0.330] [0.686] [0.459]
Big five auditor -1.112*** 0.039 -1.122** 0.115 -0.914** -0.188
[0.000] [0.889] [0.038] [0.762] [0.034] [0.638]
Analyst coverage 0.005 -0.028 -0.011 -0.016 -0.003 -0.037
[0.831] [0.206] [0.826] [0.584] [0.900] [0.209]
Institutional ownership -0.035 -0.122 -0.316 -0.403 0.095 0.184
[0.923] [0.620] [0.686] [0.258] [0.826] [0.575]
Sales growth 0.383 -0.351 0.230 -0.607 0.529 -0.202
[0.249] [0.364] [0.687] [0.277] [0.200] [0.692]
Segments -0.008 -0.548** 0.797* -0.817*** -0.327 -0.385
[0.972] [0.017] [0.054] [0.006] [0.268] [0.157]
Reporting standard 1.514* -0.799 0.621 -1.374
[0.060] [0.476] [0.518] [0.163]
(Continued)
χ2 (1) =3.29 [0.070] χ2 (1) =3.85 [0.050]
(2) (3) (1)
χ2 (1) =7.20 [0.007]
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TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
 
Foreign Firms US Matched firms Weak rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Weak Strong rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Strong
Country Controls
Accounting difference -0.400 1.566 0.106
[0.636] [0.337] [0.932]
Country market cap -0.000 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.695] [0.045] [0.715] [0.145] [0.211] [0.132]
Country GDP growth  7.612* -9.190 14.188* -13.011* 2.327 -5.487
[0.096] [0.108] [0.060] [0.085] [0.765] [0.561]
Auditor legal liability 0.974 -1.142 0.395
[0.240] [0.528] [0.628]
Constant -5.465*** 0.675 -3.685 -0.966 -4.869*** 1.446
[0.000] [0.708] [0.124] [0.651] [0.001] [0.518]
Pseudo R-squared 0.117 0.143 0.219 0.153 0.139 0.194
# obs 2,088 2,307 819 995 1,184 1,285
Country controls (Appendix) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3)
 
Notes: Panel A shows the percentage of firm-years in each sample group that subsequently report a restatement, split into firm-years with reported internal control 
deficiencies during the same year, but before the restatement  was discovered. Panel B report s the estimation from a logistic regression of equation (3). The 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm's financial statements were restated subseque ntly, and zero otherwise. We use the 
country sample median of the rule of law index (=1.64) to classify firms into those from strong and weak rule of law countries. The rule of law index is from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators created by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. (2003) and used in La Porta et al. (2006)). Coefficient estimates and p -values (in 
parentheses) are from seemingly  unrelated regressions of restatement probability on IC Weakness and other controls. F -tests compare the coefficients of the 
ICWeakness variable for the weak rule of law country sample and its US matched sample, as well as the strong rule of law country sample and its matched sample. 
All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. P-values are based on t-tests for differences in mean. Significance is 
denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a two-tailed test. 
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TABLE  7:  DISCLOSURE CHOICE AND HOME COUNTRY RULE OF LAW 
Panel A:  Percentage of stealth restatements by the severity of restatements and home country rule of law 
Foreign firms US matched firms
Foreign
: weak  rule of law countries US matched: Weak
Foreign
: strong  rule of law countries US matched: Strong
High_Magnitude 55.32% 32.94% 61.29% 30.30% 52.38% 34.62%
Low_Magnitude 68.80% 48.00% 77.65% 55.42% 64.64% 44.79%
Difference [p-value] 13.48% [0.018] 15.06% [0.015] 16.36% [0.079] 25.12% [0.014] 12.26% [0.086] 10.17% [0.190]  
Panel B:   Likelihood of stealth disclosure by home country rule of law, conditional on restatement magnitude 
 
Foreign Firms US Matched firms
Foreign 
: weak rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Weak
Foreign 
: strong rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Strong
Magnitude -0.841** -2.017*** -1.555* -5.448*** -1.021** -1.533**
[0.025] [0.000] [0.084] [0.000] [0.042] [0.026]
F- test [Prob > χ2]
Firm Controls
Size 0.12 -0.303 0.23 -0.501 0.084 -0.247
[0.368] [0.108] [0.452] [0.176] [0.641] [0.281]
Leverage -0.049 -0.992 0.456 -5.181 0.153 -1.477
[0.956] [0.418] [0.880] [0.111] [0.890] [0.283]
ROA_current -1.220 0.138 -3.071 0.974 -0.218 1.082
[0.278] [0.933] [0.400] [0.788] [0.861] [0.647]
ROA_lagged -0.654 -0.547 0.266 -6.918 -2.542 -0.609
[0.566] [0.696] [0.928] [0.128] [0.104] [0.713]
Book-to-Market -0.061 -0.395 0.363 -0.485 -0.187 -0.398
[0.853] [0.400] [0.725] [0.462] [0.666] [0.503]
Big five auditor 1.446*** -0.752 1.128 0.993 2.023** -1.014
[0.008] [0.179] [0.331] [0.464] [0.016] [0.109]
Analyst coverage -0.086** 0.026 -0.050 0.145* -0.082** -0.002
[0.010] [0.459] [0.786] [0.058] [0.040] [0.960]
Institutional ownership 0.186 0.982* 1.004 1.836 0.296 0.971
[0.683] [0.098] [0.500] [0.158] [0.624] [0.175]
Sales growth -0.094 -0.599 -0.666 -3.067* 0.026 -0.526
[0.808] [0.214] [0.514] [0.071] [0.952] [0.345]
Segments -0.617** 0.585 0.186 -0.000 -1.052** 0.747
[0.035] [0.176] [0.801] [1.000] [0.011] [0.135]
Reporting standard -0.780* 1.895* -1.328*
[0.089] [0.088] [0.057]
Constant 14.196*** 19.866*** 11.092** 11.917 11.095*** 20.218***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.026] [0.488] [0.000] [0.000]
# obs 319 262 79 74 205 186
Pseudo R-squared 0.234 0.202 0.266 0.441 0.278 0.201
Country controls (Appendix) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3)
χ2 (1) =3.22  [0.073] χ2 (1) =5.61 [0.018] χ2 (1) =0.36 [0.549]
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Foreign Firms US Matched firms
Foreign 
: weak rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Weak
Foreign 
: strong rule of law countries
US matched firms
: Strong
Duration -0.018** -0.026** 0.012 -0.080*** -0.024** -0.022*
[0.021] [0.016] [0.668] [0.004] [0.017] [0.090]
F- test [Prob > χ2]
Firm Controls
Size 0.139 -0.217 0.17 -0.035 0.066 -0.208
[0.282] [0.195] [0.603] [0.911] [0.704] [0.326]
Leverage 0.191 -1.275 0.825 -3.629 0.506 -1.899
[0.829] [0.259] [0.802] [0.227] [0.651] [0.166]
ROA_current -1.245 0.735 -1.046 0.065 -0.155 1.623
[0.286] [0.661] [0.779] [0.988] [0.903] [0.492]
ROA_lagged -0.071 -1.164 1.574 -3.405 -1.792 -1.567
[0.951] [0.413] [0.570] [0.275] [0.220] [0.395]
Book-to-Market -0.037 -0.406 0.741 -1.127 -0.139 -0.412
[0.912] [0.393] [0.414] [0.110] [0.749] [0.512]
Big five auditor 1.354** -0.441 1.204 0.285 2.025** -0.762
[0.011] [0.436] [0.235] [0.837] [0.010] [0.243]
Analyst coverage -0.080** 0.028 -0.099 0.128 -0.071 0.001
[0.020] [0.445] [0.591] [0.122] [0.100] [0.983]
Institutional ownership 0.114 0.919 1.332 1.282 0.173 1.093
[0.798] [0.138] [0.351] [0.311] [0.771] [0.151]
Sales growth -0.048 -0.459 -0.306 -0.627 -0.002 -0.585
[0.904] [0.296] [0.746] [0.675] [0.996] [0.221]
Segments -0.627** 0.437 0.091 -0.857 -1.015** 0.754
[0.028] [0.302] [0.904] [0.362] [0.012] [0.142]
Reporting standard 1.453 -1.609 3.044***
[0.116] [0.614] [0.010]
Constant 13.335*** 18.459*** 9.475* 4.744 11.462*** 19.945***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.066] [0.673] [0.000] [0.000]
# obs 319 262 79 74 205 186
Pseudo R-squared 0.233 0.175 0.235 0.318 0.284 0.196
Country controls (Appendix) YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3)
χ2 (1) =0.41  [0.524] χ2 (1) =5.43 [0.020] χ2 (1) =0.01 [0.929]
TABLE  7 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C:   Likelihood of stealth disclosure by home country rule of law, conditional on restatement duration 
  
Notes: Panel A of this table shows the percentage of stealth restatements (i.e., restatements that are not announcement via either 8-k disclosure, 6-k disclosure, or press release) by 
the severity of the restatements. The high magnitude group includes restatements where the cumulative effect of the restatement on equity, scaled by total assets, is in the top quartile 
of the restatement sample. Panels B and C present a seemingly unrelated logistic regression of the likelihood of stealth restatements on restatement severity. The dependent variable is 
an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the  restatement was not announced via 8k, 6k, or press release announcement, zero otherwise. The severity of restatements is measured 
using restatement magnitude, the cumulative effect of the restatement on equity, scaled by total assets (Panel B), and restatement duration, the number of months the restatement 
event affected the financial statements (Panel C). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a 
two-tailed test. 52 
 
TABLE 8: PCAOB ENFORCEMENT AND RESTATEMENT PROBABILITY OF FOREIGN 
FIRMS 
Panel A:  Percentage of restatements by foreign firms with auditors that allow PCAOB inspections 
Weak  rule of law
PCOAB Allowed
Weak  rule of law
PCAOB Not Allowed
Strong  rule of law
PCAOB Allowed
Strong  rule of law
PCOAB Not Allowed
EM= High (5th Quintile) 8.91% 2.27% 14.72% 8.40%
EM= Low (1st Quintile) 6.65% 8.57% 11.01% 9.42%
Difference [p-value] 2.27% [0.212] -6.30% [0.023] 3.71% [0.025] 1.02% [0.770]
Panel B:  Likelihood of restatements and home country rule of law, by PCAOB inspectability   
Model: Restateit =  β0+  β1*EM_Indexit+ β2-17*Controlsit + Year FE+ Industry FE +εit.           (2)  
Weak rule of law countries
PCOAB allowed
Weak rule of law countries
PCOAB not allowed
Strong rule of law countries
PCOAB allowed
Strong rule of law countries
PCOAB not allowed
EM_Index 0.038 -0.335*** 0.110** -0.021
[0.605] [0.007] [0.033] [0.883]
F- test
 [Prob > χ2]
Firm Controls
Size 0.011 -0.120 -0.052 0.028
[0.864] [0.313] [0.396] [0.779]
Leverage 0.172 1.204 0.139 0.327
[0.824] [0.392] [0.802] [0.795]
ROA_current -1.993*** -2.833 -0.621 -0.878
[0.005] [0.126] [0.190] [0.507]
ROA_lagged 0.639 3.336** -0.233 -1.538
[0.476] [0.026] [0.645] [0.373]
Book-to-market -0.012 1.236*** -0.018 0.807**
[0.955] [0.004] [0.910] [0.021]
Big five auditor -0.582** -2.054*** 0.683*** 0.500
[0.019] [0.000] [0.003] [0.667]
Analyst coverage 0.003 0.037 0.014 0.084***
[0.916] [0.409] [0.393] [0.008]
Institutional ownership 0.642* -1.756*** 0.139 0.753
[0.087] [0.008] [0.623] [0.365]
Sales growth 0.325 1.269 0.004 -0.446
[0.151] [0.104] [0.984] [0.541]
Segments 0.233 0.172 0.063 -0.379
[0.280] [0.626] [0.740] [0.416]
Reporting standard -0.125 1.359* -0.050 0.280
[0.716] [0.072] [0.816] [0.594]
Constant -7.991*** -4.421 -4.884*** -6.786***
[0.000] [0.190] [0.000] [0.009]
# obs 2,255 775 4,101 639
Pseudo R-squared 0.162 0.282 0.067 0.213
Country controls (Appendix) YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES
(1) (2)
χ2 (1) =6.81 [ 0.009] χ2 (1) =0.73 [0.394]
 Notes: Panel A of this table shows the percentage of firm-years in each country-group subsequently restated, split into 
two groups: firms with an auditor who is inspectable by PCAOB and firms with an auditor who is not inspectable by 
PCOAB. Panel B presents a regression analysis of the difference in the relationship between earnings management and 
the likelihood of restatement for the sub-group of PCAOB-inspectable reporters versus the non-inspectable reporters, 
within the weak and strong rule of law groups. We use the country sample median of the rule of law index (=1.64) to 
classify firms into those from strong and weak rule of law countries. The rule of law index is from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators created by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al. (2003) and used in  La Porta et al. (2006)). 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. Significance is denoted by  ***,  **, and *  for 1%, 5%. and 10% 
respectively, using a two-tailed test. 53 
 
Foreign firms US matched firms
Foreign firms: weak  
rule of law countries US matched: Weak
Foreign firms: strong  
rule of law countries US matched: Strong
EM= High (5th Quintile) 11.25% 17.16% 6.95% 17.97% 14.09% 16.61%
EM= Low (1st Quintile) 9.50% 13.36% 7.77% 13.85% 11.02% 13.01%
Difference [p-value] 1.74% [0.113] 3.81% [0.003] 0.82% [0.582] 4.12% [0.040] 3.07% [ 0.048] 3.60% [0.027]
TABLE 9: SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS USING DIFFERENT ENFORCEMENT MEASURE 
Panel A: Percentage of restatements by level of EM and home country enforcement  
Panel B: Likelihood of restatement and EM, by home country's level of  enforcement 
Foreign Firms US Matched firms
Weak rule of law 
countries
US matched firms
: Weak
Strong rule of law 
countries
US matched firms
: Strong
EM_Index 0.037 0.092*** -0.031 0.134*** 0.093* 0.067*
[0.358] [0.004] [0.617] [0.003] [0.065] [0.081]
F- test
 [Prob > χ2]
Firm controls
Size -0.051 -0.006 -0.005 0.062 -0.081 -0.057
[0.182] [0.895] [0.931] [0.346] [0.170] [0.264]
Leverage 0.099 0.514 0.548 0.246 0.049 0.677*
[0.808] [0.110] [0.366] [0.567] [0.927] [0.064]
ROA_current -1.162*** -1.032*** -1.923*** -0.499 -0.743* -1.426***
[0.002] [0.010] [0.004] [0.344] [0.088] [0.004]
ROA_lagged 0.241 0.572 0.665 0.742 -0.213 0.455
[0.535] [0.188] [0.325] [0.197] [0.669] [0.432]
Growth opportunities 0.034 0.093 0.053 0.146 0.180 0.053
[0.768] [0.343] [0.778] [0.267] [0.239] [0.669]
Big five auditor -0.100 0.002 -1.058*** 0.235 0.720*** -0.167
[0.528] [0.983] [0.000] [0.170] [0.001] [0.259]
Analyst coverage 0.018 -0.010 -0.007 -0.018 0.023* -0.005
[0.135] [0.368] [0.775] [0.197] [0.099] [0.692]
Institutional ownership 0.263 0.328** 0.139 0.193 0.321 0.428***
[0.237] [0.016] [0.675] [0.273] [0.249] [0.007]
Sales growth 0.132 0.049 0.436** 0.026 -0.050 0.056
[0.347] [0.729] [0.047] [0.898] [0.793] [0.747]
Segments 0.133 0.055 0.192 -0.227 0.043 0.258**
[0.306] [0.653] [0.272] [0.182] [0.817] [0.034]
Reporting standard 0.121 0.467 0.108 0.972 -0.199 0.332
[0.439] [0.339] [0.676] [0.357] [0.326] [0.556]
Constant -4.825*** -1.869* -5.671*** -3.142* -5.579*** -1.038
[0.000] [0.099] [0.000] [0.065] [0.000] [0.503]
# obs 7890 7890 3415 3415 4475 4475
Pseudo R-squared 0.057 0.067 0.109 0.078 0.078 0.070
Country Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
(1) (2) (3)
χ2 (1) =1.15  [0.284] χ2 (1) =4.56 [0.033] χ2 (1) =0.17 [0.679]
Notes: We use the modified rule of law index (Leuz, Nanda, and Wysocki (2003)) to classify firms into those from strong 
and weak rule of law countries. The modified rule of law index is the mean score of three law enforcement variables 
identified in La Porta et al. (1998). Panel A shows the percentage of firm-years in each sample group that subsequently 
report a restatement, split into the highest and lowest quintiles of the EM index.  The calculation of the EM Index is 
described in Appendix A. Panel B reports the estimation from a logistic regression of equation (2). The dependent variable 
is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm's financial statements were restated  subsequently, and zero 
otherwise. Coefficient estimates and p -values (in parentheses) are from seemingly unrelated regressions of restatement 
probability on EM index and other controls. F-tests compare the coefficients of the EM_Index variable for the weak rule of 
law country sample and their U.S. matched sample (Models (1) and (2)), as well as for the strong rule of law country 
sample and its matched sample (Models (3) and (4)). All other variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level. Significance is denoted by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, using a two-tailed 
test. 